MODERNIZATION IN THE MANITOBA NORTH: THE HOUSING INITIATIVE

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Abstract/Resume

Housing has been an important means of government intervention and domination in Aboriginal communities. Hydro-electric power developments in northern Manitoba present clear cases of modernization initiatives which allow observers to document and evaluate the experience of Aboriginal communities with government housing programs.

Le logement est un moyen important d'intervention et de domination des gouvernements dans les communautés indigènes. Les développements d'énergie hydro-électrique au Manitoba du nord présentent des exemples distincts d'initiatives de modernisation qui permettent aux observateurs de documenter et d'évaluer les expériences des communautés aborigènes des programmes de logement du gouvernement.

Introduction

The contemporary history of Canada's Native communities is the history of government intervention. From the *Indian Act of 1876* through to the amended version of 1985, government in Canada has attempted to dominate the Aboriginal community. Whether this has taken the form of Treaty payments, education funding or housing subsidies, government has actively sought to control the community affairs of Canada's First Nations. Disregarding such important elements of Native culture as kinship ties, folk tradition or spatial orientation, government efforts have clearly ignored the community aspirations of Canada's First Peoples, and further, misinterpreted the circumstances of the Aboriginal community.[1]

Under the guise of what has been described as a policy of "humanity first," the interventionalist theme of the federal government's program initiative is particularly pronounced in the post-World War II era (Valentine and Young, 1984:51). Responding to the perceived community needs of the Native population, both the federal and to a lesser extent, the various provincial governments, implemented a series of programs that were intended to address the issues of community well-being, a central feature of which was the so-called "modernization" of Native communities (Shkilnyk, 1981:24). (It was actually suggested at one point by the Canadian Tuberculosis Association that "[I]t was medicine which showed the way North after 1945" [Collard, 1983:7].) In the post-war era, government regularly employed the rhetoric of modernization as the justification for redefining Aboriginal communities. While in selected situations modernization did introduce new housing, better equipped schools, utility servicing and even linear street patterns, for the most part, the modernization initiative introduced a whole new process of community and community development. It may have improved the physical appearance of the community but it did so to the detriment of Aboriginal culture, tradition and way of life.[2]

In Manitoba the best examples of the modernization initiative are associated with the hydro-electric power projects of northern Manitoba. Although other cases could be cited, such as the Churchill relocation program of 1957-1958 or the Lynn Lake industrial operation of 1964-1968, it is through Manitoba Hydro's Churchill-Nelson River Hydro-Electric Project that the most vivid documentation of the modernization experience can be gleaned.[3]

Focusing on the seven Native communities of Chemawawin, South Indian Lake, Cross Lake, Nelson House, Norway House, Split Lake and York Landing, the modernization process can be described as a hydro-induced program of re-development. In each case, the community was forced to accept the consequences of Manitoba Hydro's development plan. Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through to the present

day, however, the seven communities have yet to fully acquiesce under the re-development program. Reacting to the problems of flooding, dam building and river diversion, the Native communities are still toiling with the issues of relocation, compensation, retraining and the general socio-economic upheaval that has accompanied the hydro project.

The housing component of the modernization process is perhaps the best indicator of a poorly designed program. Whether through the relocation schemes of Chemawawin and South Indian Lake or through the compensation packages of the Northern Flood Agreement, the housing needs of the seven Native communities have never been properly measured nor have they been adequately met. When, for example, new units were constructed, they were built on rock thereby totally precluding the development of even the most rudimentary form of water service or sewage disposal. Conversely, when water and sewage disposal systems were introduced, it was at the expense of either new units or the rehabilitation of old stock. Disregarding the rampant problems of affordability, overcrowding, repair and/or rehabilitation costs and even, on occasion, utility servicing, modernization was at best a quick fix.[4]

Housing as introduced by the modernization initiative failed miserably in two areas. First and perhaps most important in terms of the self-determination of Canada's First Peoples, the housing programs of the post-World War II era did not recognize either the unique quality of Native culture or the long standing traditions of Aboriginal communities. Housing had previously been self-built, spatially organized to reflect both the day to day housing needs of the community as well as the occupants' relationship to the land, usually located in close proximity to kin and augmented by a random number of out buildings. In the modern era of government intervention, housing was often designed to meet government defined building codes, prefabricated in southern centres, shipped to Aboriginal communities, assembled by skilled tradesmen from elsewhere and located in a preplanned pattern that was generally more appropriate in a suburban setting than in the First Nations' community. The units themselves were compartmentalized into small living areas which offered little room for work or storage, factors particularly important to a people who required space for the cleaning of game, the preparation of furs or the repair of equipment. As well, the houses often lacked even such rudimentary design niceties as a cold porch. While the housing units clearly did not meet the cultural needs of First Nations peoples, the structures also failed to meet the shelter needs of the population. What was provided through the modernization initiative was for the most part too costly, too small, prone to rapid degeneration and in many cases, unserviced. Raising the rather serious questions of affordability, overcrowding and housing adequacy, the housing units actually did little to provide for the long term housing needs of Aboriginal communities. Indeed in many ways the housing

exacerbated an already problematic situation. The housing units made available through the modernization initiative of the hydro program clearly did not provide for either the cultural or the shelter needs of Manitoba's First Nations, and at best must be viewed as a quick fix to the Aboriginal community's housing conundrum, a fix that was designed and implemented in consideration of the best interest of government as opposed to that of the Native population.

Background

The decision to harness the hydro potential of northern Manitoba was based upon a series of studies conducted between 1954 and 1958 (Matthiasson, 1972:593). Measuring both the water power of Manitoba's northern rivers and the projected hydro needs of the province, the preliminary reports recommended that Manitoba Hydro pursue the development of the Churchill-Nelson River systems. The first phase of the operation was the construction of the Grand Rapids Hydro Project. Located at the point where the Saskatchewan River flowed into Cedar Lake, the project called for the damming of the river and the building of a 472 megawatt generating station (Waldram, 1984:206). In the process, Cedar Lake, which had been the traditional home to the Swampy Cree and Métis peoples of the Chemawawin Indian Reserve, was to be converted into a giant reservoir. Begun in 1961, by 1964 the project had forced the relocation of approximately 352 Chemawawin residents from the banks of Cedar Lake to the newly established community of Easterville (Landa, 1969:37).

The second phase of the hydro project was the construction of the Missi Falls Dam at the outlet of Southern Indian Lake. Designed in an effort to control the flow of the Churchill River, the dam raised the water level of Southern Indian Lake by approximately ten feet. It also facilitated the diversion of Southern Indian Lake into the Nelson River system. Known familiarly as the "high level diversion" scheme, the Southern Indian Lake reservoir was intended to act as the control reservoir for the whole hydro project (Waldram, 1984:218). At the same time, however, because of the massive flooding induced by the damming of the river, the community of South Indian Lake with its some 600 residents was scheduled for relocation (Matthiasson, 1972:595). Construction on the Missi Falls Dam began in 1969 and in 1975 the community of South Indian Lake had been consolidated in its new location on the eastern side of the lake, high above the threatening waters of the burgeoning reservoir.

By 1974, the disruptive nature of the hydro project on northern Manitoba had become painfully obvious. Not only had the two communities of Chemawawin and South Indian Lake been relocated, but the Native population in general had been terribly inconvenienced by the flooding of traditional hunting and trapping land. As a result, the most

seriously affected Native communities banded together in 1974 to form the Northern Flood Committee (NFC).[5] Representative of the communities of Cross Lake, Nelson House, Norway House, Split Lake and York Landing, the NFC defined its goal as to

> ...fight for the justice in the areas of Treaty land and Treaty rights and to fight for northerners in areas which do not fall into this category but who will face disruptive and negative effects due to the project (Waldram, 1984:227).

Arguing that the flooding of Reserve land was in violation of Treaty Number Five, the NFC sought to negotiate an end to the flooding or, in lieu of a moratorium, compensation for the dislocation caused by hydro development. The Northern Flood Agreement, which was signed in December of 1977, offered to NFC communities a framework for compensation *(Ibid.*:231). The major features of this agreement included:

1. Any band whose land is affected by the Hydro project is to receive four acres of land for each affected acre....
2. The necessary training for the employment of local residents on the construction project.
3. The people of the affected communities are to be given "first priority" to all wildlife resources within their trapline zones and in the rivers and lakes....
4. Manitoba....
5. Compensation for damages to fishing and trapping are to be negotiated..." (*Ibid.*:232).

Although the main focus of the Northern Flood Agreement was clearly the enhancement of employment opportunities, a shift occurred through its application which gave rise to the greater recognition of housing and community needs as a priority item. Article 6.1 of the agreement, which detailed housing upgrading, came to form the main thrust of the initiative.[6] Indeed, with federal government financing to the tune of $88.5 million, the NFC communities experienced the same type of modernization program as was implemented at Chemawawin and South Indian Lake.[7]

Chemawawin

In the fall of 1960 the approximately 350 residents of the Native community of Chemawawin were informed of Manitoba Hydro's intention to dam the Saskatchewan River. While relocation was suggested as the only feasible solution to the flooding of Cedar Lake, consultation with the local residents concerning the move did not occur until 1962. Through a provincially appointed committee, the Grand Rapids Forebay Committee,

negotiations were started in March 1962 for the surrender of Reserve lands and the creation of a new community (Landa, 1969:45-46). Although the local citizenry had formed a flood committee to consider the consequences of the government's proposal, by the time the first meetings were held in Chemawawin, Manitoba Hydro had already begun preliminary work on the project. The actual site of the new community, however, was still very much in doubt. With three alternatives available-Clear Bay (48 kilometres east of Chemawawin); East Mossy Portage (32 kilometres south of Chemawawin); and Easterville (51 kilometres southeast of Chemawawin)-the local committee appointed representatives to visit the sites and finalize the selection process.[8] In the end the Easterville site was chosen with the notation that this "site is on a limestone ridge and there was potential for a good road possibly electricity."[9]

On 7 June 1962, the Band Council accepted the provincial government's "Letter of Intent" which outlined the particulars of the relocation program. Ratified in November by an Order-in-Council, the relocation scheme included:

1. The provision of new or reconditioned homes with pit toilets and electricity.
2. The construction of a new school.
3. The establishment of a forest management unit for the exclusive use of the community.
4. The establishment of a "planned" community, part Reserve for Treaty members of the community and part non-Reserve for the non-Treaty members.
5. The construction of a road to the community.
6. The use of local labour "as much as possible" in the construction of the townsite.
7. The exchange of land in the ratio of two acres of new land for each acre of Reserve land taken.
8. The payment of $20,000 into the Band's account.
9. The undertaking of "scientific and engineering studies and investigations in order to assure maximum economic development..."
10. The undertaking of "every step possible to maintain the income of the people of Chemawawin at the new site" (Waldram, 1984:211-212).

On the basis of the so-called letter of intent, the people of Chemawawin moved in the summer of 1964 to the newly established community of Easterville. Leaving behind a community in which there were no roads, no electricity and housing stock consisted of either self-built "log houses or tar-paper shacks," the local population opted for the modern

conveniences of a government built townsite (Waldram, 1987:2).

The modern townsite, however, was not as gracious a host as it first appeared. Although, as argued by Waldram, "the new community looked modern, with its streetlights, gravel roads, new school, hall and houses," the reality of the situation was quite a bit different (*Ibid.*:6). Easterville was constructed on a limestone ridge which meant that not only was the community devoid of vegetation but also that use of modern conveniences such as the pit-toilet were completely out of the question. Exacerbating the waste disposal conundrum was the fact that grey water eventually found its way into the community's water supply.

Compounding the physical problems of the community were the economic hardships encountered in the new townsite. The traditional economic pursuits of the Chemawawin Band, which had been hunting, trapping and fishing, were almost entirely obliterated by the flooding of Cedar Lake. This was particularly true of trapping and fishing. As has been argued elsewhere, with over 90% of the Band's trapping grounds under water and the growing presence of mercury poisoning in the water of Cedar Lake, the economic potential of the community was severely limited (Matthiasson, 1972:594).

The complexion of the new community has been reasonably well documented by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development's (DIAND) housing survey (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1974:14). Undertaken in 1974, the statistics afford a detailed account of everything from housing conditions to sewage disposal. Surveying 58 houses in Easterville, DIAND paints a fairly positive picture of housing stock. Over 94% of the total stock was assessed as in either "good" or "very good" condition. A partial explanation for the highly rated quality of housing stock was the fact that in 1974 none of the units were over ten years old. Indeed, according to DIAND, the age ratio of the Easterville portfolio was roughly 10% under 3 years, 29% under 9 years and the remaining 60% 9-10 years of age. In terms of services, the units were provided with electricity but not much else. Water was only available by well and over 91% of the houses were serviced by outdoor toilet facilities-which in effect meant the dumping of grey water.

Perhaps a more accurate and certainly a more contemporary assessment of housing stock can be gleaned from figures compiled by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985:83-85). In 1985, CMHC-generated data showed that 45 units accommodated a total Easterville population of 234 inhabitants. Of these, 22 units were in either the CMHC or the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation's (MHRC) portfolio; 12 homeownership and 10 rental units. Of the sample provided by CMHC's so-called "Big Picture," none of the stock had water or sewage servicing and approximately 27% of the units were heated by wood. The two most disconcerting items noted by CMHC were outstanding arrears and repair

estimates. Offering a most vivid account of the quality of life in Easterville, repair estimates on housing stock averaged around $5,000 per unit. Although this figure is not high by northern standards, it does suggest a rather rapid degeneration process. In terms of affordability, the outstanding debt load of the community also indicated a certain strain on the quality of life. On the ten rental units, average back rent owed was $243 per unit. From a high of $1,000 to a low of $25, all but two of the rental households had money owing. A similar story is told of the homeownership units with average payments in arrears totalling $1,978 per unit. A slight difference between rental and homeownership stock, however, is the fact that five of the twelve units or 41% of the homeownership sample, had no money owing in back payments. Nonetheless, from an arrears high of $7,909 through a mid-range of $4,800 to a low point of $1,800, monthly payments were still a contentious issue. Although there was clearly an affordability problem in Easterville, with average monthly rental payments of $124 per unit and average monthly mortgage payments of $148 per unit, the problem was much larger than simply affordability. The residents did not have the income to accompany the rapid modernization process which took place in the post 1964 era. Conjuring up images of what Chislett *et al.* have cited as "housing mismatch," the housing conundrum of Chemawawin-Easterville was not solved by the building of brand new dwelling units (Chislett,Green and Bone, 1987:341-346).

South Indian Lake

The Churchill River Diversion Project, which included the construction of the Missi Falls Dam on Southern Indian Lake, impacted on the local population in much the same way as the Grand Rapids initiative had on the Chemawawin population. In the case of the village of South Indian Lake, however, Manitoba Hydro was seemingly more willing to negotiate the process of modernization. Indeed, as suggested by one government official, Manitoba Hydro had actually "learned from the past" mistakes of the Chemawawin relocation scheme (Waldram, 1984:217). Nonetheless, the negotiated move of the South Indian Lake community was even more controversial than the Chemawawin-Easterville undertaking. Involving at various times the Nelson House Indian Band, Manitoba Hydro, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Department of Natural Resources, the Manitoba Environment Council, government commissioned consultants, a United-Anglican church committee and a private committee composed of University of Manitoba faculty members, the relocation project eventually became an election issue (Matthiasson, 1972:599). In the end, however, Manitoba Hydro prevailed and by the summer of 1974, the waters of Southern Indian Lake were on the rise and the new community of South Indian Lake was blossoming forth. In the process, the people of South Indian Lake who were referred to by the

Manitoba Hydro commissioned report as "anachronisms in the age of technology," had in fact become secondary to the perceived benefits of hydro-electric power development (Waldram, 1984:218).

There were actually two communities in the vicinity of Southern Indian Lake that were affected by the hydro scheme: the village of South Indian Lake, which housed approximately 479 residents, and the smaller community of Granville Lake with its population of slightly less than 200 inhabitants (Matthiasson, 1972:595). Although both communities were touched by the flooding, it was South Indian Lake that experienced the greatest degree of dislocation. Regarded as one of the most prosperous Native communities in northern Manitoba, South Indian Lake accommodated both Treaty and non-Treaty residents (Transition in the North, 1967:6). Seventy-five percent of the total population (360) were Treaty Indians belonging to the Nelson House Indian Band, 21% (111) were Métis or non-Treaty and roughly 18 were non-Native. Almost entirely dependent upon a trapping and fishing economy, the flooding had a disastrous impact on the community's traditional livelihood *(Ibid.*:23).

The pre-relocation complexion of the community of South Indian Lake has been vividly captured in the consultants' report prepared by Van Ginkel Associates in 1967 (*Ibid.*:38-40). Although the conclusions offered by the consultants were very much in keeping with the Manitoba Hydro perspective, the statistical data provided valuable insight into the composition of the community. In general, the report identified 61 dwelling units. These ranged from log-framed to frame to plywood structures. Approximately 80% of the total stock was log-framed. The majority of the units were one room houses with only one-third of the total number having separate kitchens and a further one-third having separate bedrooms. The houses were small in size, with well over 62% of the total stock under 400 square feet per unit. The obvious problem of overcrowding was not only a factor of size but also the number of persons per unit. It would appear that on the basis of the summary material provided by Van Ginkel and Associates that each unit accommodated approximately seven residents.

In terms of services or the so-called "housing conveniences," four items can be isolated, further alluding to the quality of the units; outdoor toilets, special heaters (mostly electric or kerosene), wood stoves and storage facilities or out buildings (*Ibid.*:40). Of the total 53 households reporting waste disposal techniques, 100% reported the use of outdoor facilities. More surprisingly perhaps was the number of households that relied on a "special heater" for heating purposes. Approximately 97% of the reporting households, roughly 50% of the total stock, indicated that they used a special form of heating beyond the traditional wood stove. The majority of these were electrical space heaters. The cook stove which functioned as both a source of heat and a method of food preparation was found in all households. Out buildings too, were a prominent feature of the community, with all reporting households indicating that a "warehouse"

was a component of housing amenities.

While it is difficult to ascertain the quality of housing stock, beyond size and selected conveniences, from the consultants' report, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development offers a fairly complete assessment of premove housing conditions (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1974:17). Citing a total of 57 units in South Indian Lake in 1974, Indian Affairs presents a bleak picture of housing stock. Over 54% of the total stock, or 31 units, were rated by federal officials as being in very poor condition. Even more telling was the fact that over 74% of the houses were evaluated as in no better than fair condition. In contrast, only 21% of the stock or 12 units were ranked in the good or very good category. The age of the structure was a major consideration in the quality of the unit. In South Indian Lake, 61% or 35 units were over ten years old. The remaining stock was under 9 years of age; with 13 units one to three years and 7, four to nine years.

Housing services were also gauged by the 1974 report; offering further insight into the quality of housing facilities found in the pre-1974 community. Measured in terms of the availability of electricity, the method of water service and the type of sewage treatment facilities provided, the survey of housing services offered an equally bleak overview of South Indian Lake housing stock. Only 21% of the total housing stock had access to electricity. This is somewhat surprising given that the consultants' report indicated that 57% of the units had a special heating capacity but it can be explained in part by the availability of kerosene heaters (Transition in the North, 1967:40). All of the 57 units documented by Indian Affairs depended upon the river/lake for water. A majority of the units-68%-also depended upon outdoor toilet facilities for sewage disposal. A slight curiosity is the fact that 5.2% of the total households surveyed had no toilet facilities whatsoever.

The decision to "consolidate" the community of South Indian Lake in its new location was made in May of 1974.[10] While the potential for hydro-electric power production was clearly the driving force behind the re-location scheme, Manitoba Hydro also emphasized the possibility of resolving "the problem of the remote Indian settlement" as a motivational factor (Waldram, 1984:231). Very much apart of the modernization initiative, Manitoba Hydro informed the residents of South Indian Lake that it was willing to:

1. Move or replace with equivalent structures all existing buildings at the new site, and where necessary, build new homes at a standard comparable to those being built by the Department of Northern Affairs in other northern communities.
2. Provide docking facilities at the new site.
3. Replace or pay for fish camps which would be flooded or

destroyed.

4. Clear the area required for the new site...
5. Pay the costs of moving the people and their personal effects.
6. Make arrangements suitable to the residents to move and/or suitably mark existing graves...
7. Cooperate with other agencies to the extent of $60,000 the cost of construction of a floating fish plant at South Indian Lake.
8. Share with other government agencies the cost of training programs for up-grading the skill of residents.
9. Share with other government agencies in the cost of adult education concerning Southern Indian Lake prior to the relocation.
10. Provide under mutually satisfactory arrangements, a boat equipped with an electronic depth and fish detector (Matthiasson, 1972:596).

With Manitoba Hydro assuming the lead role, the village was shifted to its new location on the east side of the small channel at the neck of the diversion project. Hydro, for its part, and at a cost of $2.1 million, constructed 45 new houses and relocated 7 others to the new site. The federal government through Indian Affairs, erected 18 houses and the provincial Department of Northern Affairs constructed an additional 4 units. The total number of new units erected on the site was 67 and, when combined with the 7 relocated units, the new community boasted a total stock of 74 units. The cost of the undertaking to the Manitoba government alone was slightly over $16 million. This figure included housing, housing related services, a community centre and the large number of compensation programs initiated by the provincial government.

By 1985 there were approximately 135 housing units in the South Indian Lake village (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985:244-246). Accommodating roughly 812 inhabitants, the community had obviously prospered, at least in terms of residents, since the relocation program. A sampling of the housing stock suggests that South Indian Lake was indeed a modern town. At the same time, however, the opportunity cost of the move raises serious doubts about the actual benefits of the relocation scheme. Much like the Chemawawin-Easterville case, commercial fishing was almost completely destroyed, traplines were to a large extent underwater, hunting patterns were thoroughly disrupted by the ecological imbalance caused by the flooding and on top of all this, mercury poisoning had become a way of life. As was suggested by one disgruntled resident:

> Hydro promised us a new town, but they didn't say how much it was going to cost us (Waldram, 1984:231).

A sampling of housing conditions in South Indian Lake provided by CMHC offers a selected overview of contemporary housing stock (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985:244-246). Reporting on the 27 units delivered by the Rural and Native Housing Program (RNH), CMHC documented a 20% sampling of housing conditions. Of the 27 units delivered under the RNH mandate, 26 were CMHC homeownership units and one was a Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation rental unit. All but two of the units had money owing in the way of back rent or mortgage payments. Ranging from a high of approximately $5,000 to a low of $10, the incidence of arrears suggests that there was a very serious affordability problem in South Indian Lake. This is further underscored by the fact that even such nominal monthly payments of $18 per unit were often not made.

A second and equally significant problem was home maintenance. Also reflecting a certain inability on the part of the occupant to fund maintenance or repair projects, estimated per unit repair costs were generally high *(Ibid.*). Averaging $11,000 for the 27 units, the cost of repairs was even more disconcerting when consideration was given to the fact that the majority of units were only slightly over ten years of age. Not only does this imply a rapid deterioration of housing stock, it also infers that little thought was given to the implementation of an on-going maintenance program.

In terms of servicing, and based on the availability of sewage disposal, water and electrical servicing as well as the method employed to heat the structure, the sample units were all reasonably well provided for *(Ibid.)*. All but two of the 27 houses had holding tanks and electrical service, and were heated by electricity. The two exceptions-one of which was the rental unit-had no servicing whatsoever and were heated by wood stoves. Overall, however, the quality of servicing does not accurately reflect the quality of housing stock within the community. As suggested, the majority of the units were in various states of disrepair with, in most cases, a relatively high debt load. Electrical servicing and sewage disposal did not compensate for the deterioration of housing stock.

Cross Lake

Cross Lake is located approximately 520 kilometres north of Winnipeg. The community consists of three settlements. Two are identified by Indian Affairs as Indian Reserve (IR) 19 and 19A while the third, the townsite of Cross Lake, borders both Reserves, but because of its non-Reserve status is administered by the provincial Department of Northern Affairs.[11] The total population of the Cross Lake district as tabulated by the 1981 census is 2, 148; with the community accounting for 581 individuals, IR 19 some 895 and IR 19A the remaining 672.[12] Composed of Status and non-Status Indians, Métis and non-Native inhabitants, the regional

complexion of the community provides for considerable variation in terms of the availability of services and facilities.

The community of Cross Lake is one of five Northern Flood Agreement (NFA) communities that banded together in 1974 under the mandate of the Northern Flood Committee (NFC). Although the NFC was not officially recognized by the provincial government until 1976 and did not sign the NFA until 1977, it still attempted to represent the Native community in the early hydro negotiations.[13] Pursuing a variety of compensation claims, the NFC eventually became a very strong lobby organization for the Native population. At the same time, however, the Northern Flood Committee assumed much of the responsibility for the administration of Manitoba Hydro's newly defined community development initiative. Although not as drastic as the relocation schemes of Chemawawin and South Indian Lake, the modernization schedule as introduced in Cross Lake included new housing, the rehabilitation of older stock and the provision of water servicing and sewage disposal. Cited by the NFC-commissioned consultant's report as "housing upgrading," the reality of the modernization initiative was housing shortages, overcrowded living conditions and serious affordability problems (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:1).

Housing stock in Cross Lake was composed almost entirely of single detached units. Of the 394 houses in the community recorded by Statistics Canada, 98% were of the single detached variety. Of these, roughly 54% had been built within the last ten years. The majority of units were owner occupied with only 8% of the total stock occupied as rental units.[14]

Housing affordability was a serious issue for both homeowners and renters in Cross Lake. A selected sampling of housing stock as delivered in the community by the RNH program showed an average arrears rate of approximately $2,000 per unit (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985:68-70). While the rental stock showed a slightly higher dollar figure per unit owing than the homeownership stock, arrears high on mortgage money owing was roughly $2,000 more than rental money owing. Even with monthly housing costs hovering around the $100 mark, both homeowners and renters had difficulty making regular payments. Explained in part by the fact that, according to Statistics Canada, slightly over 50% of the total population had a yearly income of less than $10,000, housing costs in Cross Lake were, if not prohibitively high, certainly a burden.[15] The so-called "housing upgrading" as initiated by Manitoba Hydro not only increased the per household debt load of Cross Lake residents but it also dramatically affected the quality of life within the community as housing costs had to be balanced against the cost of such "luxuries" as food and clothing.

The second major housing problem that confronted Cross Lake residents was overcrowding. Based on the assumption that two or more

families per household was an overcrowded dwelling, 33.7% of the housing stock in Cross Lake was overcrowded (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:10). Household composition data indicates that there were 261 one-family households, 81 two-family households and 52 three or more family households in the community (*Ibid.*:9). Of the total 206 families living in overcrowded conditions, 157 expressed a desire for single family accommodation and therefore alternative housing. A second measure of overcrowded living conditions, two or more persons per bedroom, could also be applied in Cross Lake. With 133 units accommodating two or more occupants per bedroom, housing need in the community appeared to be both a product of extended family relationships and the size of the individual family (*Ibid.*:20). In light of the fact that average family size in Cross Lake was 3.69 members per family, however, it would seem that overcrowding was the result of inadequate housing rather than family size. Indeed, based upon figures supplied by the Winnipeg consulting firm of Hilderman, Witty, Crosby, Hanna and Associates, the community would require over 489 new units by 1997 to meet the local populations' housing need (*Ibid.*:87).

Cognizant of the problems associated with prohibitively high housing costs and overcrowded/overburdened housing stock, the Northern Flood Committee introduced the process of modernization. Rather than build new houses or repair old housing stock, however, the NFC identified housing services as the housing priority in Cross Lake. Operating with an initial budget of $13 million and a revised budget of $88.5 million, the NFC sought to provide each household with indoor plumbing.[16] Despite the serious housing shortage, the overcrowded living conditions and the obvious affordability problems, the flood committee in its efforts to modernize the community attempted to guarantee that each household was outfitted with bathroom facilities-functional or otherwise.

Nelson House

The community of Nelson House is located some 60 kilometres west of Thompson on the shores of Footprint Lake. At one time a major post in the fur trade exploits of the Hudson Bay Company, the community has become a focal point for the district's Native population. With a population of approximately 1,156, Nelson House is the hub of the non-urban, Native community in the Thompson district (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:20). Given its close proximity to the city, however, population mobility is one of the major issues confronting the community. The location of Nelson House offers inhabitants the opportunity of a sojourning existence. Although the support mechanisms for the urban shift are woefully lacking in Thompson, there has developed a reciprocal relationship between the two communities. Compounding the migrating flavour of the community is the

fact that there is also movement between Nelson House and South Indian Lake. The populations of both communities are of the Nelson House Band, and although permanency in each community has been established, there is still considerable travel between the two centers.

Housing stock in Nelson House appeared to be of three varieties: single-detached, semi-detached and duplex units.[17] Of the 189 dwelling units in Nelson House, approximately 91% were single-detached and 4% each were semi-detached and duplexes. The average age of each unit was roughly 15 years; with 48% of the stock erected during the last 15 years and 48% during the last 20 years. The remaining houses were all built over twenty years ago. There was a far greater proportion of rental units available in Nelson House than in most other NFC communities. Approximately 24% of the total housing stock was rental stock. A partial explanation for the large rental component is the mobile nature of the population. In any case, average monthly rental payments were fairly high when compared to mortgage payments. Rental households paid on average $34 more in monthly housing costs than homeowners. Average monthly rental payments were in the neighbourhood of $127 per unit as compared to $93 for mortgage payments. With over 33% of the households having a per house average annual income of less than $5,000, monthly payment schedules on a regular basis were more often than not the exception.[18] Indeed, using CMHC arrears information, average per unit arrears on both rental and homeownership stock was $1,750 (Canada Mortgage and Housing, 1985:180-181).

Overcrowding at Nelson House, like Cross Lake, was and continues to be a problem. As suggested by the NFC commissioned report, next to Cross Lake Nelson House has the second highest ratio of families per household (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:12). Using the two families per house indicator as the measure of overcrowding, 32.3% of all housing units in Nelson House were overcrowded (*Ibid.*:10). There were 128 one-family households, 49 two-family households and 12 households with three or more families (*Ibid.*:13). The final count on families per unit shows that 75 families lived in the community without separate accommodation. Compounding the overcrowding equation is the fact that roughly 63 households were households with two or more individuals per bedroom (*Ibid.*:18).

While the two major housing priorities in Nelson House were clearly affordable housing and either larger or a greater number of housing units, the NFC, in its efforts to modernize the community, made servicing its' number one priority. In this regard, the Flood Committee attempted to ensure that each household was connected to both water and sewage disposal servicing. In the end, however, and although bathtubs were installed and sinks outfitted, the majority of households still lacked the necessary services to make the bathtubs and sinks functional.

Washrooms, functional or otherwise, did not alleviate the problems associated with overburdened or unaffordable housing units.

Norway House

The community of Norway House, like Nelson House, traces its contemporary roots to the fur trade and the activity of the Hudson Bay Company. Unlike Nelson House, however, Norway House in the mid-19th century surpassed the simple tasks of a trading post, becoming a major entrepot and supply depot in the fur trade empire. The present community of Norway House is actually two communities; the Reserve community of Rossville and the non-Treaty settlement located on the banks of the Nelson River. Approximately 70% of the district's inhabitants reside at Rossville. It has been described as a "relatively compact community" which caters to the needs of a mixed population (Redekopp, 1968:91-113).

Norway House is the largest of the five NFC communities. It boasted a 1987 population of 2,325 inhabitants (*Ibid.*:20). Of the total number of residents approximately 54% were under the age of twenty. It was, however, a slightly older population than the other four NFC communities as over 40% of the population fell into the middle age group of 21-54 years (*Ibid.*:43). In terms of family composition, there were 572 families in Norway House, with an average family size of 4.06 members per family (*Ibid.*:56).

The housing stock in Norway House, like all other NFC communities, was dominated by single detached units.[19] Of the 429 houses in the community, 96% were of the single detached variety. The remaining four percent were equally divided between semi-detached and duplex units. Four of the duplexes were Elderly Person's Housing stock delivered by Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation under the Rural and Native Housing Program (Canada Mortgage and Housing, 1985:4). In terms of tenure, slightly over 89% of the housing stock was owner occupied. Monthly housing costs of these units were, on average, $98 per month as compared to the cost of the rental units which averaged $62 per month. Like the other NFC communities, the relatively low monthly payments were balanced by the fact that over 42% of the households in Norway House had an income of less than $10,000 per year. The end result was a fairly significant per unit debt load. In a sampling of 61 RNH delivered units, for example, the average arrears rate was $1,463 per unit (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1985:4). Although this was high compared to the provincial RNH average arrears rate of $713, it was still lower than both Cross Lake and Nelson House. Indeed, Norway House boasted the largest percentage of non-arreared housing units of all NFC communities. Approximately 29% of the RNH delivered stock in Norway House was unencumbered by payment problems (Canada Mortgage and Housing

Corporation, 1985:4).

Housing adequacy was also an issue in Norway House. Overcrowded dwelling units, as measured by persons per room as well as by families per unit, was more often than not, a common experience in the community. Approximately 125 of the 429 occupied houses in Norway House or, roughly 30% of all households, recorded two or more people per bedroom. Further, almost 27% of the dwellings accommodated two or more families. There were 314 one-family households, 91 two-family households and 24 three or more family households in the community (*Ibid.*:15). In the end, some 143 families lived in households of two or more families; 76 of whom or, roughly 53% of the total, were interested in acquiring separate housing (*Ibid.*:14). In addition to these households, there were approximately 13 off-Reserve families who had indicated a desire to relocate, a number of Bill C-31 families considering relocation and a number of new family formations, all of whom will require housing (*Ibid.*). It was in fact estimated by the NFC commissioned study that Norway House will require a minimum of 335 new units by 1997 in order to accommodate the increasing demand for housing units (*Ibid.*:87).

Norway House, like all northern communities, suffered from the rapid deterioration of housing stock. In part resulting from climatic conditions, inappropriate building design and/or construction, inadequate maintenance schedules and "mismatched housing," housing degeneration was an ongoing problem. In Norway House, survey results compiled by Indian Affairs indicated that slightly over 53% of the housing stock in the community was in fair or worse condition (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1974:16). Further data collected by Statistic Canada showed that 64% of the total housing stock required either "minor" or "major" repairs.[20] There was, it appears, a pressing need for the rehabilitation of housing stock in Norway House.

Unaffordable, overcrowded and rapidly deteriorating housing stock typified the modernization initiative in Norway House. While the NFC toiled with providing electrical servicing or bathroom fixtures, the number one housing priority, which was new housing or the rehabilitation of older stock, remained on the periphery of the decision making process.

Split Lake

The community of Split Lake is located approximately 125 kilometres northeast of Thompson on the shores of Split Lake. Established in 1886 by the Hudson's Bay Company, the community was originally centered on the Hudson's Bay Company's post. The majority of inhabitants are descendants of relocated York Factory Band members who, around the turn of the century, elected to move to the Split Lake site (Taunton, 1978:333). The relocation eventually gave rise to the formation of the Split

Lake Indian Band and although there was a close connection between the two Bands, the Split Lake Band was very much a separate entity.

The community housed a 1987 population of 1,061 inhabitants (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:20). Roughly 97% of the residents were Status Indians. The remaining 3% of the population were, according to Health and Welfare data, non-Status residents (Taunton, 1978:336). The number of families in the community totalled 212 with an average family size of 5 members per family (*Ibid.*:59).

The total number of housing units in the community as documented by the NFC stood at 188 (*Ibid.*:23). Ninety-six percent of the 188 houses were singled detached with the remaining number being semi-detached units.[21] Of the total stock, roughly 93% were erected in the last twenty years. The majority of units in the community were owner occupied as only 6% of the stock was classified by Statistics Canada as rental property. For the rental clients, average monthly payments were in the neighbourhood of $72 per unit. Conversely, for the homeowner, mortgage payments were considerably higher, reaching an average of $118 per month. As with the other NFC communities, average incomes were low, making even nominal monthly rental or mortgage payments difficult. In the case of Split Lake, slightly over 51% of household incomes were less than $10,000 per year.[22]

Using the two families per household gauge as the measure of overcrowded living conditions, Split Lake had the lowest incidence of overcrowding of all NFC communities. The percentage of overcrowded houses in the community was calculated at 11.7% (Northern Flood Committee, 1987:10). Further, Split Lake was determined to have the lowest ratio of families per house with an average of 1.13 families residing in each unit *(Ibid.*:9). The results of the NFC commissioned survey showed that there were 166 one-family households, 21 two-family households and 1 three or more family households (*Ibid.*). According to the consultants findings, of the 24 two or more family households, 23 families indicated a desire for separate accommodation (*Ibid.*:14). This large percentage can in part be explained by the generally high average of people per unit, which was estimated at 5.64 (*Ibid.*).

The quality of housing in Split Lake as determined by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was fairly evenly split between satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Of the 108 units surveyed, roughly 48% were ranked as either very good or good, while approximately 52% were described as of fair, poor or very poor quality (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1974:17). Within this range of housing quality there appeared to be a polarization between the good and the very poor ends of the spectrum. Over 66% of all housing stock fell into these categories with the remaining 34% filtering somewhere between the two extremes.

The greatest housing need in Split Lake was clearly dictated by family size. With an average of 5 members per family, there was a continual demand for either new stock or additions to existing stock. Housing related funding, however, was for the most part directed towards the provision of sewage and water service. While these services improved the quality of life in the community, the reality is that they provided little in the way of shelter for households in need.

York Landing

The community of York Landing is a fairly recent one. It was established in 1957 to accommodate the displaced population of York Factory. When the Hudson's Bay Company closed its York Factory post a large portion of the post's inhabitants relocated to the site of York Landing. Located on the southeast shore of Split Lake, the community is approximately 20 kilometres south of the settlement of Split Lake. York Landing, however, tends to function more as a base community than a permanent settlement. Like many of the smaller Native enclaves, it serves as a regional centre as opposed to a host community.

York Landing is the smallest of the five NFC communities. It housed in 1987 somewhere in the neighbourhood of 244 inhabitants (*Ibid.*:20). Approximately 38% of the total population was under the age of 14 and a further 19% was between the ages of 15 and 20. Fifty-seven percent of the community's inhabitants were therefore under the age of twenty (*Ibid.*:43). The family structure of the community was such that 64 families resided in York Landing with an average family size of 3.81 members per family.

There were, according to the NFC survey, 48 houses in York Landing (*Ibid.*:9). The quality of housing stock varied from very good to very poor. The majority of units (59%), however, were classified by Indian Affairs as of fair to very poor quality (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1974:17). A partial explanation for the negative appraisal of housing stock was the overall age of housing in York Landing. Well over 50% of the dwelling units in the community were over ten years of age. While the general quality of stock was not particularly good, the services available within the community were on par with other NFC communities. Fifty-six percent of the houses had been provided with electricity while all units depended on the river or lakes for water and outdoor toilets for sewage disposal.

York Landing also had a problem with overcrowding. Again, using the two families per unit measure, slightly over 27.1% of all dwelling units were overcrowded (*Ibid.*:10). Although this was the lowest percentage of all NFC communities it was still a source of aggravation. There were 35 one-family households in York Landing, 11 two-family household and 2 households with three or more families per house (*Ibid.*:18). When combined with the 13 off-Reserve families desirous of relocating to the

community, the total number of families wanting separate accommodation in York Landing was 23 (*Ibid.*:17). Although this was significantly lower than the other NFC communities, when projected over ten years, York Landing had a housing need of approximately 56 new units (Ibid.:91). Like the other NFC communities, York Landing's housing problems were not going to be solved by the provision of water and sewage disposal servicing.

Conclusion

The modernization of Manitoba's Native communities as undertaken in conjunction with Manitoba Hydro's Churchill-Nelson River Hydro Project, has had a phenomenal impact on the province's Indigenous peoples. From the flooding of traplines to the relocation of total settlements, the hydro operation has drastically altered the traditional way of life of selected Native communities. Although in a limited way (i.e. short term employment or job training), the hydro initiative has had a beneficial affect, in a general sense the impact has been mostly negative. Certainly short-term employment has resulted from the initial construction phase but the long range problems of mercury poisoning, unemployment, social assistance and the variety of degenerative problems accompanying the socio-economic disruption of community, far out-weigh the short-term benefits of a wage-economy.

The housing component of the modernization initiative offers a fairly good measure of program applicability. Very much in keeping with the standard anti-modernization argument, the case can be made that the program has never clearly recognized the unique quality of Native culture nor the specific community needs of Manitoba's First Nations. New housing which was the number one housing priority in all seven communities, was far too often neglected in favour of housing services. The provision of water servicing did not solve the housing problems of overcrowding, affordability or housing adequacy. When new housing was made available it was done so under the guise of community development which meant that the new units were grouped in neighbourhoods, regulated on specific building lines and with site development geared to the demands of modern servicing as opposed to the actual needs of the local residents.

More importantly, however, given the highly visible problems of overcrowding, affordability, repair and rehabilitation and even in some cases, utility servicing, it was apparent that the real housing needs of the Native population were not met by the modernization program. Whether at Cross Lake where 33% of the housing stock was determined to house two or more families, or Easterville where average household arrears were estimated at $2,000, or even South Indian Lake where repair costs per unit were gauged at $11,000, each of the seven communities still toiled with the so-called benefits of the hydro modernization scheme.

Notes

1. For a more detailed account of the circumstances of the Native community, see Buckley, Kew and Hawley (1963); Diermenjian and Jones (1983); Driben and Trudeau (1983); Shkilnyk (1981a; 1981b); Simon, Forster, Alcose, Brabec and Ndubisi (1984); Valentine and Young (1984); and Waldram (1983).

2. See for example Brody (1977); Burke (1976); Loxley (1981); Stone (1965) and Waldram (1983).

3. See a description of the Churchill project in Dickman (1969); Lal (1969a; 1969b), and the Lynn Lake experience in Matthiasson (1970) and Stevenson (1968).

4. Affordability, overcrowding, repair and/or rehabilitation and utility servicing are generally regarded as the main indicators of adequate housing. For more details, particularly in terms of the Aboriginal community, see Indian and Northern Affairs (1976; 1980; 1985).

5. Commission of Inquiry into Manitoba Hydro, *Final Report*, Winnipeg, 1979, pp. 210-211.

6. *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report*, Prepared for the Northern Flood Committee in Association with Reid Crowther Partners by Hilderman Witty Crosby Hanna and Associates, 1987, p. 1.

7. The budget announcement was made during the week of April 18-22, 1988. For details see *The Winnipeg Free Press,* 23 April 1988.

8. *Transition in the North: The Churchill River Diversion and the People of South Indian Lake,* A Study Prepared for Manitoba Development Authority by Van Ginkel Associates with Hedlin, Menzies and Associates Ltd., Winnipeg, 1967, Volume 1, p. 53.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Commission of Inquiry into Manitoba Hydro, *Final Report*, p.

11. Commission of Inquiry into Manitoba Hydro, Final Report, p.

12. Canada-Indian and Inuit Communities, Prairie Provinces, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, National Atlas Data Base Map Series, Map No. NADM-4.

13. *Census of Canada*, 1981.

14. For a detailed account of the process see: A Chronology of the Churchill Development, *Manitoban,* Special Supplement, November 1974, p. 4.

15. *Housing Needs Analysis-Final Report,* p. 1.

16. *Census of Canada,*1981.

17. *Census of Canada,* 1981.

18. Specific budget details are difficult to ascertain. For further information see, *The Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 April 1988.

19. *Census of Canada*, 1981.

20. *Census of Canada*, 1981.

21. *Census of Canada*, 1981.

22. *Ibid.*

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
South Indian Lake
Split Lake
Nelson River
York Landing
Nelson House
Hayes River
Cross Lake
Norway House
Easterville
Lake Winnipeg
Lake Manitoba
Assiniboine River
WINNIPEG
Red River
MANITOBA
0 20 40 80 120
MILES

Table 1: Population

	1981	1985	1987
Chemawawin-Easterville		234	
South Indian Lake		812	
Cross Lake	2,148		2,213
Nelson House	761		1,156
Norway House	1,812		2,325
Split Lake	985		1,061
York Landing			244

Source: *Census of Canada*, 1981; *Rural and Native Housing "Big Picture,"* CMHC, 1985; *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report*, 1987.

Table 2: Housing Stock
(Number of Units Per Community)

	1974	1987
Chemawawin-Easterville	58	
South Indian Lake	74	
Cross Lake		394
Nelson House		189
Norway House		429
Split Lake		188
York Landing		48

Source: Commission of Inquiry into Manitoba Hydro, *Final Report*, 1979; *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report*, 1987; *Manitoba Region Housing Study*, 1974.

Table 3: Per Household Income

	>5,000	5,000 to 9,999	10,000 to 14,999	15,000 to 19,999	20,000 to 24,999	25,000 to 29,999	30,000 to 39,999	40,000
Chemawawin-Easterville								
South Indian Lake								
Cross Lake	40	95	55	30	25	10	5	5
Nelson House	40	25	15	20	10	5	5	
Norway House	35	75	55	50	30	15	30	
Split Lake	30	50	30	25	10	5	5	
York Landing								

Source: *Census of Canada,* 1981.

Table 4: House Payments

	Average Gross Rent	Average Gross Mortgage
Chemawawin-Easterville		
South Indian Lake		
Cross Lake	$105.(30)	$100.(250)
Nelson House	$127.(30)	$93.(95)
Norway House	$62.(30)	$98.(260)
Split Lake	$72.(10)	$118.(145)
York Landing		

Source: *Census of Canada*, 1981.

Table 5: House Payments on RNH Delivered Stock

	Average Rental Payment	Average Mortgage Payment
Chemawawin-Easterville	$124.(10)	$145.(12)
South Indian Lake	$18.(1)	$160.(26)
Cross Lake	$147.(10)	$174.(17)
Nelson House	$116.(5)	$151.(11)
Norway House	$165.(22)	$157.(39)
Split Lake		
York Landing		

Source: *Rural and Native Housing "Big Picture,"*, CMHC, 1985.

Table 6: Arrears on RNH Delivered Stock

	Average Arrears Rent	Average Arrears Mortgage	Arrears High Rent	Arrears High Mortgage	Arrears Low Rent	Arrears Low Mortgage
Chemawawin-Easterville	$243.(10)	$1,978.(12)	$1000.	$7,909.	$25.	$1,800.
South Indian Lake	$632.(1)	$1,111.(26)	$632.	$5,070.	$632	$00.
Cross Lake	$2,451.(10)	$2,032.(18)	$5,558.	$7,441.	$00.	$00.
Nelson House	$1,061.(5)	$2,063.(11)	$3,039.	$8,964	$700.	$00.
Norway House	$2,265.(22)	$1,010.(39)	$8,425.	$8,023	$00.	$00.
Split Lake						
York Landing						

Source: *Rural and Native Housing "Big Picture,"* CMHC, 1985.

Table 7: Houses per Community with the Number of Families per Unit

	Number of Houses	Number of Houses with 1 Family	Number of Houses with 2 Families	Number of Houses with 3+ Families	Percentage of Units with 2+ Families
Chemawawin-Easterville					
South Indian Lake					
Cross Lake	394	261	81	52	33.7%
Nelson House	189	128	49	12	32.3%
Norway House	429	314	91	24	26.8%
Split Lake	188	166	21	1	11.7%
York Landing	48	35	11	2	27.1%

Source: *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report,* 1987.

Table 8: Number of Units per Community with two or more People per Bedroom

Chemawawin-Easterville		
South Indian Lake		
Cross lake	133	(33.8%)
Nelson House	63	(33.3%)
Norway House	125	(29.1%)
Split Lake	52	(27.7%)
York Landing	10	(20.8%)

Source: *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report*, 1987.

Table 9: Number of People per Unit

Chemawawin-Easterville	
South Indian Lake	
Cross lake	5.61
Nelson House	6.11
Norway House	5.41
Split Lake	5.64
York Landing	5.08

Source: *Housing Needs Analysis - Final Report*, 1987.

Table 10: Average Repair Estimate per RNH Delivered Unit

Chemawawin-Easterville	$5000.
South Indian Lake	$11,481.
Cross lake	$5,000.
Nelson House	$13,125.
Norway House	$6,311.
Split Lake	
York Landing	

Source: *Rural and Native Housing "Big Picture,"*, CMHC, 1985.

Table 11

Band or Community		Chemawawin	Cross Lake	Nelson House	Norway House	South Indian	Split Lake	York Factory
Number of Houses		58	231	127	253	57	108	32
Number of Families		54	223	155	239	60	120	29
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%
General Conditions of Housing	Very Good	5.2	8.7	4.7	2.4	14.0	6.2	
	Good	89.6	54.1	81.1	40.3	7.0	38.9	25.0
	Fair	5.2	2.6	3.1	36.8	7.0	20.4	25
	Poor	0	6.5	2.4	12.3	15.8	3.7	9.4
	Very Poor	0	26.8	8.7	3.9	54.4	27.8	25.0
	No Info	0	1.3	0	4.3	1.8	0	9.4
Age of Housing	1-3 Yrs.	10.3	27.7	11.0	24.5	22.8	21.3	18.8
	4-9 Yrs.	29.3	38.1	41.7	48.2	14.0	51.9	18.8
	10 Yrs & Over	60.4	33.3	47.3	22.5	61.4	28.8	50.0
	No Info	0	0.9	0	4.8	1.8	0	12.4
Houses with Electricity		100	84.0	88.6*	82.2	21.1	77.8	56.3

continued....

Houses with Telephones		1.7	82.7	77.9	56.1	0	0	0
Water Supply	Water System	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0
	Stand Pipe	0	0	0	18.2	0	100	0
	Well	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
	River or Lake	0	100	100	100	100	0	100
	Rainwater Dugout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Hauled	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	No Info	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sewage Treatment	Sewer System	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Septic Tank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Toilet: Chemical:	8.6	2.2	0	25.7	3.5	21.3	0
	Toilet: Outdoor	91.4	87.9	100	95.7	68.4	71.3	100
	Nil	0	11.7	0	0	5.2	0	0
	No Info	0	0	0	0	24.8	14.8	0

Soure: *Manitoba Region Housing Study*, 1974.