

GROUP APRAXIA: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ACCULTURALISM

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ABSTRACT/RESUME

The author reviews the concepts of acculturation and phenomenology. He suggests that Canadians as a whole still seek the assimilation of Aboriginal people into non-Aboriginal culture. At the same time, the intentional system in Canada runs counter to the conscious purposes of the system. The results is group apraxia.

L'auteur étudie les concepts d'acculturation et de phénoménologie. Il suggère que dans l'ensemble les Canadiens recherchent encore l'assimilation des Autochtones dans la culture exogène. En même temps, le système intentionnel au Canada va à l'encontre des buts voulus du système. Il en résulte l'apraxie du groupe.

Scholarship may plod by microns, but it serves the invaluable function of protecting a culture against rage, irrationality and unreason. Cross-cultural studies must continually weigh the value of broad, generic concepts against the possible ruin of constructive scholarship. Although cross-cultural communication is impossible without large, broadly conceived ideas, those may undermine disciplined discourse even as they facilitate cultural interaction. A transient moment of community, achieved at the prohibitive expense of reinforcing prevailing stereotypes, is a difficulty that is not easily resolved.

This paper attempts to facilitate cross-cultural dialogue by positing an ideal type of Western, scientific culture. It follows a line of reasoning inspired by Max Weber:

We can make the *characteristic* features of this relationship pragmatically *clear* and *understandable* by reference to an *ideal-type*. This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes... It is not a *description* of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description (1949:90).

This essay is offered in the hope that if cultures can recognize their own taboos on critical self-reflection, then each might take a healthy step toward each other and toward a more humane society.

The phenomenological approach has a few special features which recommend it to one who wishes to engage in serious self-reflection. Phenomenology suggests that one may not understand one's real intentions unless one looks at the way objects appear to "behave" in the "life world." Things reveal the true intentions of the systems, organization, community or political state in which they occur. The life which "things" have is saturated with human purposes.

A second important feature of a phenomenological approach is the tenet that representational systems communicate intentionality. No group functions without sharing a tacitly understood intentional system. The group need not be conscious of the way they communicate their intentions in order to be skilled interpreters of the shared intentional context. The related point most relevant for this essay suggests that systematic method is not the same as objective method. A project may be systematic, thorough and fiscally honest and still be culturally biased. In the case of the relationship between Aboriginal Canadians and the dominant non-Aboriginal majority, the best laid plans of a self-styled benevolent majority may still intend the assimilation of other cultures.

Phenomenology predicts that group efforts - cooperation, if you will - break down when the tacit intentional messages grounded in everyday attitudes become contradictory or run counter to the conscious, publicized rationalizations of the group. This paper suggests that the intention to assimilate still animates the predominant attitude toward Aboriginal

peoples in Canada. The ethnocentrism of the intentional system runs counter to the conscious purposes of the system. Worst-case, opposite-end scenarios such as the Oka confrontation of 1990 can be the apraxic result: inexplicable, counterproductive, unameliorated breakdown.

Edmund Husserl conceived the original phenomenological project as a criticism of Dilthey's hermeneutics:

Dilthey has not yet seen that the relationship to objects to consciousness comprises the radical essence of psychic life. (Husserl, quoted in Arens, 1989:193).

Husserl's radical contention was that unexamined intentional systems invested in "objects of consciousness" constitute our so-called objectivity and give the life-word its "trans-subjective validity" (Arens, 1989:195-6).

Bodley estimates that 50 million Aboriginal people may have died as a result of contact with non-Aboriginal people. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Aboriginal peoples suffered a worldwide population loss the equivalent of their entire estimated precontact population. The depopulation rate in North America during this period approached 95% (Bodley, 1982:40). Genocide was not usually the conscious intention of the dominant intruder, but was often the by-product of war and disease. Of the indigenous peoples who have survived, few have been unaffected by extended contact with the industrial culture of the West. Most Aboriginal peoples who have survived into the late twentieth century have been forced to accommodate the syndrome euphemistically called "acculturation."

Young and McDermott define acculturation as the "power of various experiences and institutions to induce among individuals and groups the acceptance of new values, norms and behavior"(1988:195). They conclude approvingly that the process can be subtly induced through media, schooling and the workplace. Their model is prevalent, defines culture in terms of learning theory (Kluckhohn, 1962:26), and finally equates acculturation with economic adaptation (Willner, 1964; Gusfield, 1967; Hirschman, 1965). The utilitarian emphasis is evident and renders the model suspect. As a basis for public service policy and intervention, the prevalent model of acculturation has characteristics which may be a little more than psychological artifacts left over from the disastrous period of Western military hegemony. In some ways, the prevalent model may be as ulterior and debilitating as the overbearing military dominance it supercedes.

Herskovits gave acculturation the contemporary connotation. He concluded that an accultured Aboriginal society "have on the whole adapted themselves with considerable success to the impact of Western civilization...[In such cases] the culture is not the traditional culture nor is it the civilization of the European inhabitants. It includes elements of both; but they have been combined into a new and distinctive pattern" (1980:65).

A distinctive new pattern in the culture of the Aboriginal, not the Westerner, defines the practical frame of reference. Acculturation is therefore measured in terms of the norms of the intruding society, not the Aboriginal society whose folkways are being challenged. The utility assumed for the context of acculturation is first of all based upon the presumed superior rights of the intruding society and then in the second place, granting the unavoidability of cross-cultural conflicts in so small a technological world, a self-validating objective consistency in the intentions and attitudes of the technologically superior intruder. Herskovits' adapt or die definition fitted acculturation into the market context of practical utility where nothing, as yet, has succeeded quite as well as success. The social code of practical utility was written into many aspects of the cultural system.

In 1952 Herskovits published an important monograph which later appeared as an introduction to the proceedings of the XXIXth International Congress of Americanists held in 1949 (Tax, 1967). In this monograph he discussed acculturation in theoretical detail. He concluded that the process of acculturation:

does not differ in fundamental theoretical assumptions from the study of diffusion and the reconstruction of history that dominated anthropology during the first quarter of this century (Herskovits, 1952:48).

The monograph reminds us that acculturation began as a research tool for the "reconstruction of the history of nonhistoric people" (Ibid.:50) Since written history did not exist for them, the diffusion of distinct tool techniques and cultural behaviors provided an index of tribal contact and dispersion. As Rhodes pointed out (Ibid.:132), acculturation became an American contribution to methodology which emphasized the role of individuals rather than institutions as the agent of cultural change. Herskovits agreed,

Each innovation, when presented to the individual, is project against an already existing apperceptive mass. the new cultural element must be assimilated to a previously established series of habit thought patterns, much in terms of the figure-and-ground phenomenon of gestalt psychology (1952:56).

The role of the individual keys the model. Conscious adaptation sets up a process of

reinterpretation, whereby the newly perceived cultural stimulus, always responded to in terms of the pre-existing systems of psychological reactions, sets up the new cultural patterns that will never be the same as those existing under an earlier cultural gestalt"(Ibid).

Herskovits' definition of acculturation has stood for the last forty years. In practice its description of acculturation is the working definition of the term; the importance of the accommodative practices it describes would appear to be uncontested. Nevertheless, a cruel twist in Herskovits' definition bears examining. A potentially severe emotional difficulty is built into the developmental stages of the behavioral model.

The emotional difficulty with the model lies in the subtle way it gratuitously shifts from unconscious to conscious processes of adaptation. Acculturation is conscious adaptation of foreign behaviors to the subject's unconsciously introjected psychological environment. Herskovits admits that:

In the early life of the individuals...he is more the passive recipient of a training process than later in life when, as an adult, he must continuously make choices between alternatives in possible modes of thought and behavior presented to him...it is apparent that in the early enculturative process we have an explanation for the way in which cultural stability is achieved, while the later enculturative experiences are important in understanding the psychology of cultural change (1952:56). Herskovits' description of the overall normalization process, which includes acculturation, proceeds in two stages, "early enculturation," and "late enculturation." The description blurred the distinction between unconscious and conscious learning, a distinction which has remained blurred ever since.

Following Hallowell (1942), Herskovits referred to "late enculturation," as "acculturative learning," (1952:55) but after the 1952 "Preface" he eliminated the distinction between early and later acculturation. The loss of precision in language is probably culturally induced, but Herskovits is not prevented from making his meaning quite clear. "Late enculturation" is conscious adaptation "that gives greater efficiency to the achievement of aboriginal economic ends," or responds to "the anxieties aroused by the presence of greater physical power." (1952:56). The cruel twist in Herskovits' model is the Levi-Straussian synchronism which it assumes underlies all human thought. Lentricchia (1980:128) calls it "duplicitous," describing the attitude as "a binary opposition that is both an underlying structure and a method of revealing that structure (a method which pretty much amounts to the engineer's project."

Levi-Strauss defined the need to classify as a universal faculty, no different from "savage" to sophisticated, which culminated in the ability of an individual to objectively distinguish his own body and physical faculties from the objective, external environment (1966:172). The rank order of cultural progress implied in the Levi-Straussian schema can be construed as empowering more "objective" cultures to assist the "progress" of the less objective ones. Here is one reason Heidegger describes the primary element in Western metaphysics as its insistent aggressiveness. "In technological thought we see calculative rationality and insistent

aggressiveness meet in perfect harmony (Alderman, 1978:43)."

Scharfstein shows aggressiveness of "White" culture with examples of "White-men" jokes that are commonplace in a small American Apache town. The gifted "jokers" are able to switch from their Native tongue into a rollicking imitation of the bluff, nasal English characteristic of mid-western Americans. To mimic a White person, an Apache addresses his interlocutor with a loud, "My friend." The Apaches cannot get over how shallow and manipulative White people seem to be. The loud, boisterous greeting destroys all closeness for an Apache. He has learned that the White person only wants something. Then in the same rollicking tone, the mimic asks all sorts of embarrassing personal questions. After embarrassing everyone, he introduces the "stranger" to all who are present, revealing during the introduction even more personal and embarrassing facts. He always calls the "stranger" by his first name, touching him and rubbing up against him as if he were trying on clothes or sitting down in a new chair (1989:31-32). The gifted mimics are able to portray the aggression, intrusiveness, curiosity and tactlessness which the Apache believe is common in "White" culture.

The Levi-Straussian twist in the Herskovits model of acculturation is part of a toolbox paradigm born in Europe's historical Enlightenment and developed through the last two centuries of industrial progress. The phenomenology of this traditional attitude is the "enlightened" assumption that individuals relate to each other through the use of a core faculty common to all human beings called "reason." The sign of enlightenment which the industrially "elect" expect to see is behavior that is compelled by the evident utility of the core faculty of reason. Levi-Straussian anthropology has given strong theoretical force to basic interpersonal attitudes in the industrialized West. Goodman reasons that "The scheme suggested could not be for its truth, since it has not truth-value; but for its efficacy in world-making and understanding (1978:129)." The argument from a core faculty of "reasons" is a tool for controlling nature. What is required in cross-cultural communication is a design for dialogue.

Goldfarb defends "the culture of dialogue (1989:139)" in his discussion of the post-totalitarian mind. Goldfarb describes how Stalinism was culturally broken down in eastern Europe before it collapsed politically. At first, autonomous culture groups only knew themselves emotionally as a negation. The potential for a viable political counter-culture was first of all an undefined negative image of emotional rejection. They were apart, different-only themselves, whatever that was. In the Polish Solidarity movement:

Research was conducted with an understanding that theoretical understanding is not superior to social activists' knowledge...the researchers tried to help militants gain a more adequate self-understanding. Hypotheses were considered valid if they facilitated further discourse and self-understanding (Ibid.:125).

A phenomenological attitude opposes control-minded culture expressions such as "language is the house of the being" (Heidegger 1977: 193); "archaeologies of knowledge" (Foucault, 1972); and "reflection:"

Imagine Plato's cave not simply overthrown by some philosophical movement, but transformed in its entirety into a circumscribed area contained within another-an absolutely other-structure (Derrida, 1981:324).

The Mexican Pulitzer Prize winning novelist, Carlos Fuentes, explains that the poor campesinos saw themselves for the first time in the mirrors of the luxurious haciendas during the Mexican Revolution of 1911. Their reflection showed them the difference between their plight and aristocratic privilege. The objective, looking-glass image of the campesinos was signified in the context of social and economic difference. "Imagine," Derrida noted "that mirrors would not be in the world, but that things present, on the contrary, would be in them (Ibid.:324)."

Reflection is how a particular tradition signifies its own experience. Dialogue partners across cultures must expect to have to pass through the cultural looking-glass into the world of the other. "The central issue," Goldfarb declares, "is that of social-scientific reductionism in the service of a theoretical hubris (1989:213)." The importance of "objectivity" and practical reason has to be worked out through dialogue. No brute, factual, "thisness" is there to be discovered and proved. Benedict wrote long ago in her groundbreaking classic *Patterns of Culture*:

These ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of another society, because essentially they are incommensurable (1934:223).

Benedict's romanticism is a reminder that hardware can become more important than people.

Lakoff urged that as "concepts only exist by virtue of being embodied in a being" (1987: 318). "Whorf was right," Lakoff continued, "Concepts are used in thought not just as objects (author's italics) of thought, and they are used spontaneously, automatically, unconsciously and effortlessly." They become, "idealized cognitive models "which organize our experience (Ibid.:335; 368). Because concepts are integral to experience and not external like a tool, the structure of intersubjectivity varies between cultures. Conscious adaptation according to the Herskovits model may put

non-normatively acculturated individuals into emotional conflict with their own unconscious system of values. Early enculturation and later acculturation can seriously conflict even though self-advantage might be objectively furthered by the later process of conscious adaptation. Where early life is encultured into metaphor processes that are qualitatively different from the Western norm, then the Herskovits model of acculturation is a prescription for painful psychological distress.

The Herskovits definition is a research tool developed in order to generate taxonomies and data, not human understanding. It ignores what Seboek called "the pivotal aesthetic paradox" of humankind. Our "authentic singularity," according to Seboek, consists of simultaneously "disposing over a pair of communicative codes" (1979:30). We are "bi-logical" as well as biological creatures. Human judgment is always at one and the same time, descriptive and prescriptive. At the same time that judgment makes a knowledge claim, it also is "an incitement to an action" (Morris, 1964:40). Mead and Metraux used the basic economic function of the marketplace in different cultures as an example. Marketing performs similar basic economic function in all societies, but:

In one society the pleasure may be in skill in bargaining, so that the vendor feels defrauded if his first asking price is paid without demur; in another vendor may feel gratified if he has passed off an imperfect article at a high price, while in yet another he may get greater satisfaction from an experienced and discriminating buyer who manifests his appreciation and knowledge of the vendor's skill and taste...The case of history is parallel...We are interested in how members of a society interpret their own history (1953:79).

Mead and Metraux did not hope to bring out a psychological core of universal use-values. They felt that the only thing one could find would be a "psychological surplus value," which might then "be brought into relationship with other similar manifestations" (Ibid.:79). The toolbox paradigm of universal practical reason can be sternly and sadistically misapplied under the assumption that a cross-cultural core of generic reason awaits the persistence of the patient positivist.

In Canada, acculturation became the watchword of cross-cultural educational policy in the 1960s. The failure of a generation of residential schools to retain Native students and assimilate them into Western mores was becoming economically and morally indefensible. The first detailed Indian Residential Schools report in the summer of 1967 stated that, "Many adolescent Indians return to the reserve culture as a form of rebellion, confronted as they are with conflicting pulls between the two cultures" (Caldwell, 1967:12). Even now teachers at the Fort Alexander Reserve near Pine Falls, Manitoba refer to the generation of adults who were forced to attend residential schools in their youth as "the lost

generation." It has been the experience at Fort Alexander that this generation cynically dismisses its own culture and resists attempts to introduce Native Studies into the classroom. Caldwell wrote in 1967 "The substance of our findings was that the residential school system itself was the major factor in the lower adaptation and adjustment of Indian children" (Ibid.:14). Caldwell's conclusions were substantiated by a similar study done on behalf of the Indian Affairs Branch of the Government of Canada in the same year.

The Hawthorn Report, as the corroborating investigation was called, led to the dismantling of the residential schools and a nation-wide shift to day schools over which Native parents could exercise a degree of local control. The first Band-controlled school was soon established on the Blue Quill Reserve in Saskatchewan. The report recognized that in general Aboriginal people wanted a middle class Canadian standard of living, but that the shock of their mores and social values might mean that "the price of acculturation may indeed be too high" (Katz, 1967). Having in this way paid lip service to the problem of acculturation, the report went right ahead with a standard White middle-class economic agenda emphasizing the need for economic development, especially "techniques of mobility to enable Indians to take employment in wage and salaried jobs." Katz, a contemporary commentator on the report, observed that

The authors were being most realistic in pointing out that community development should be directed as much to whites as to Indians, a matter of the utmost importance in ensuring success. It may well be taken as a maxim.

Katz concluded "that community development is indivisible" (1967:31).

The "realism" which contemporary commentators identified in the Hawthorn Report does not lead, as Katz described it, to a conclusion that is "indivisible." Conclusive "realism" which leads to "indivisible development" is a useful discourse strategy common to "white" culture. It developed from the fascinating discovery that quantitative representation often amounts, in practice, to physical control. The realism of the report means emotionally that the linguistic behavior which calls itself "realistic" is not neutral to other social and interpersonal behaviors. It is an etic construct of the technologically adept which links language and social behavior by means of encultured presumptions that remain transparent to individuals competently socialized within them. Like the "reality" of Mead and Metraux's marketplace, the reality of the Hawthorn Report embodies its own cultural "surplus value" which is not universal and objective, but which illustrates "the foundation of a discursive practice" (Foucault, 1972: 195). History "silently speaks" in the Hawthorn report. The task of interpretation is to understand the silent history reified in the official language (Foucault, 1986: 9).

Two years after the publication of the Hawthorn report the Liberal

Party of Canada attempted to adapt it to politics, proving George Grant's lament that, "Liberalism is the ideological means whereby indigenous cultures are homogenized" (1965:80). the Trudeau government produced a white paper in 1969 "premised on the achievement of individual Indian equality" after which the reserves and the Department of Indian Affairs would be abolished (Barman, Hebert and McCaskill, 1987 [1]:15). The response of Aboriginal people against the toolbox idealism of Liberal Party welfare theory evolved into a position paper issued by the National Indian Brotherhood in 1972 entitled "Indian Control of Indian Education." Asserting that "only Indian people can develop a suitable philosophy of education based on Indian values adapted to modern living..." (Barman, Hebert and McCaskill, 1987 [2]:2), this paper marks a turning point in Native political consciousness.

The National Indian Brotherhood response (1972) discerned the assimilationism in the Department of Indian Affairs White Paper of 1967. They rejected assimilationism just as Aboriginal peoples have been rejecting similar tactics for over a century. Assimilation into the dominant society cannot be a desirable outcome for social and education policy in Canada. The Hawthorn Report and the government White Paper did not resolve the major problem for Native peoples of how to dialogue without being eaten alive.

The attitude of the Hawthorn Report and the 1969 White Paper discloses a cynical attitude toward community which fragments it more. "Development," in its terms, names a political relation between non-Aboriginal individualism and technology which discredits moral, familial or ecological realism. Developmental realism, in the context of the Hawthorn Report, is a colonial artifact where a specific linguistic behavior still encodes a stereotypical social behavior. The two behaviours fit so beautifully the axis between them is mute. Developmental realism depotentiates other potentially critical vocabularies by "objectively" associating self-interest with an abstract range of merely possible gratifications. Thus the objective aura of science is borrowed for a social problem. But this apparent similarity is only a disguise. The link between language and behavior which "white" culture unconsciously wishes to mute transforms all interpersonal relations into political and economic or heritage considerations are pre-discursively defined away. Authentic existential concern for questions which may transcend one individual lifetime or one individual's well-being cannot interrupt the airtight behavioral axis between the "real" and a white middle-class concept of personal "development." the worst part of the traditional axis is that it appears rooted in nature and therefore an inescapable condition of the lifeworld. A competently socialized Westerner not only obeys this condition, but feels morally compelled to enforce it on others.

The Rae/Edzo Indian relocation project on Great Slave Lake soon became a concrete example of the Hawthorn Report. Rae/Edzo is the

largest Indian community in the N.W.T., with a population of about 1300 Dogrib Indians. Rae was the old site founded at the turn of the century on Marion Lake, about 110 km west of Yellowknife. Health problems attributed to poor water sanitation, drainage and housing led to an attempt to move the town. Gamble, the on-site engineer during the construction project in the early 1970s, described the attempted move. "Everyone had the best of intentions....

Eventually the southern officials got what *they* needed to justify what *they* wanted to do for the people of Rae. The chief said that if all these outsiders really wanted to build the town so much, to go ahead, but the people from Rae probably wouldn't move. This was taken to be local endorsement for the project. (1986:21)

The Dogrib chief was correct. Most of the people would not move and the Canadian government could not force them. By 1985 the project had been abandoned, leaving behind, "a colossal error in technological, financial, and human terms." (Ibid.) The Rae/Edzo event is not unique. Gamble served as coordinator for the Alaska Native Review Commission and as a member of the Northwest Territories Water Board. He was an advisor for the inquiry into the social and environmental impacts of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. "What happened at Edzo is not unique," he wrote, "It fits into a larger and disturbing pattern" (Ibid.).

When Gamble turns to an analysis of the Edzo snafu, traditional explanation does not work. His analysis slides mutely across the same irreconcilable axis as the Herskovits definition. Gamble's analysis subtly shifts the focus of his story from what non-Aboriginal people do into a plea for tolerance of what other societies do. He argues utilitarianly, that tolerance will pay dividends because "by accepting the irrational we can rediscover vital human values." (Ibid.:22) Experiences like the Rae/Edzo affair led Gamble to "accept as equally valid both the rational and the irrational." (Ibid.) His personal, humanistic shorthand provides a creative and expanded range for behavior by appealing to the non-cognitive and emotional side of experience. No doubt, for an articulate and humane personality, Gamble's appeal has attraction, but there lies the problem. How can empathy and insight be introduced into policy making? Although the difference might, in some prominent cases, be indiscernable, one has difficulty imagining a Zen board meeting in which irrationality were the declared basis for policy decisions. Gamble's empirical confrontation with Rae/Edzo stimulated an honest response; but his empirical confrontation and his personal response do not match. The problem was general and public, the response do not match. The problem was general and public, but the response he was driven into was personal and private.

If it were possible to equalize the two sides of Gamble's experience, then the discussion of Rae/Edzo as a "disturbing pattern," should, it seems

to me, continue by following the patterns of dominant, non-Aboriginal behavior. The Rae/Edzo pattern needs to be expanded in discussion until it is broad enough to provide a modicum of self-understanding, even if primarily for purposes of discussion and debate. Another example of cross-cultural behavior may help to broaden the disturbing pattern of Rae/Edzo.

In Manitoba, Canada, the provincial Indian population is about 50,000. A 1967 study found that although Aboriginal people comprised about 5% of the general population, they made up about 53% of the inmate population in Manitoba's prisons (Sealey, 1980:54). The high school completion rate among Indian students remains less than one-fourth the National rate and has been slowly dropping, after peaking in 1972. The acculturation of indigenous people still presents a major social and educational challenge to the province.

Native education is a major topic in the University of Manitoba educational history and foundation courses. The recommended reasoning for its correspondence course assignment on the question is found in Sealey,(1980). Sealey begins his discussion of "new problems and recent developments" in Native education with the Hawthorn Report of 1967. He accepts the economic emphasis of the report and points out that the report "shattered the complacency of many" (Ibid.:53) He then documents many of the disadvantages facing Native children and traces them to a "new culture" of poverty characterized by "low *self-esteem*, *self-deflation* and *self-depreciation*." (Ibid.:60)

In the decade of the sixties the mass media and access to industrial goods created a materialistic revolution in Native communities. As a result the traditional values of many Indians and Metis were rapidly displaced. They were replaced, however, not by middle class values, but with those characteristic of the lowest socio-economic group in the dominant society....Undoubtedly this "new culture" is the most important single problem hindering the progress of many students of Native ancestry today. (Ibid.:59-60)

Sealey's expression of concern falls into the toolbox approach to cross-cultural dialogue. His explanation does not show how the example of non-Aboriginal middle-class values can be corrosive even in their more positive forms.

Sealey's approach is similar to Gamble's in at least one major respect. He makes the same culture-bound logical shift from what non-Natives do to a plea for tolerance of what "they" do. Affluence has presumably created a kind of anti-immune deficiency syndrome among Aboriginal people. Their resistance to destructive behaviors has been lowered. The measure of lowered cultural resistance (note the tacit nineteenth century appeal to moral edification) is *self-depreciation*, *self-*

deflation, lowered *self-esteem*. Sealey's logic resembles Gamble's. The Native experience is public, but the problem is the private response. Instead of Gamble's liberal tolerance, Sealey uses a biological metaphor in order to bridge the gap between public and private, giving his switch a similarly culturally encoded "logical" base. Self-destructive behavior cannot result from anomie (Durkheim, 1897), in Sealey's analysis, because acculturation is value neutral from the non-Native culture-bound perspective. The impact of acculturation *itself* is difficult to impugn from within the prison-house of an ethnocentric language.

Sealey, Gamble and Herskovits replicate one another in a flatearth world of Levi-Straussian social engineering, two streams of concern which consort in theory, but clash in application. Neither the logical explanation from the non-Native side, nor the emotional intuition from the minority side are able to delineate the conflict between the two cultures. Explanation and understanding remain separate and in conflict. In effect, one is being asked to tolerate a virus with the hope that generations of liberal welfare midwifery will at long last buy the patient enough time to pull through. Even when the discussion is bright with promise, if it based on the discourse of traditional acculturation, and thus cannot hold together the sustained tension of actual experience. The Levi-Straussian intentional system undermines the conscious intentional system.

As obvious as it may seem, it must require repeating: the adjustment to middle-class behaviors is not merely economic. As Weber realized:

The primary task is to recognize the special character of Western rationalism in general, and of modern Western rationalism in particular, and to explain its origins (1978:340).

Adjustment, even for survival, is a dilemma for many people because non-Native economic skills are not emotionally neutral. To absorb them, many feel that they have to surrender their morals and religion. Acculturation is not a simple choice of developing the appropriate tools. The tools carry with them their own instrumentally appropriate "cognitive style" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973:23). The subjective detachment which is characteristic of the traditional cognitive style dissemblingly elides with the institutional point of view. In a bourgeois-democratic political culture, the result is a public problem to which the response remains a private dilemma. The traditional perspective has difficulty understanding that the individual caught in a double bind between cultures does not face a political or economic choice; he faces an emotional bind.

Acculturation takes place in the primary emotions of socialization where in discourse we meet again a short-circuited interpretation. The problem is general, but the response may be seen as privatized. The problem is primary socialization; but the logical response of the dominant culture style is personal achievement in competitive categories constructed within the psychological iron maiden of that self-same

cognitive style. Of course the whole unified ecology of mind/body socialization is presented as emotionally neutral. As Plessner explains "man even attempts to master mankind in his inability to reconcile [physical] mastery with [social] understanding...an inability which we feel rather than know to exist" (38). A convenient inability, one might add, which usually gets off-loaded onto poorly socialized individuals. Cross-culturally the cycle constitutes genocide at the psychological level: Auschwitz by anomie.

The Western toolbox is instrumental, rational and calculating. It is at least characterized prominently by these traits among other things. What is less agreeable is the possible relation of instrumental calculation to an unconscious emotional system. Though not entirely placid to contemplate, "the world becomes understandable as a structure of meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities," of which "the natural objective life... can never become aware" (Husserl, 168:175). In action, especially on some one else's behalf, the Western cognitive style can create serious problems. As it "moves toward the world it buries its perceptual and practical intentions in objects" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:180). It discloses and encloses its practical, operant intentions in physical operations in the real world.

The most scholarly study of intention as a structure of interpersonal meaning is Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962). He analyzes the pathology of intentional systems using the apraxia of a wounded World War I veteran named Schneider. Schneider's apraxia presented numerous unusual behaviors. He could only perform mathematical calculations on objects he could touch. Asked to name the highest number on a list he always named the last one. He could remember a series of facts, even tell a story, but could never explain what they meant (1962:132-134). He could perform sexually but he was indifferent to the event, expressed no dismay when interrupted and never showed any inclination to resume. His "perception had lost its erotic structure" (Ibid.:156). A splinter of shrapnel in the back of his head had damaged his vision as well as his *perception*. He could not "see" what was intended. He could never infer what someone else wanted. His world had become completely literal and matter of fact. His war wound left him the perfect rationalist, able to perform computer-like instructions, but unable to function in the social world at all.

Schneider could touch a part of his body like his nose but he could not point to it. His apraxia showed a more or less complete incapacity to execute purposeful movements (Ibid.:127). Schneider was "unable to bring his own thoughts before himself, as if they were things" (Ibid.:130). He could not "apprehend simultaneous wholes" (Ibid.:126). Schneider's unusual disorder is not unknown in bureaucracies and other hierarchies. Sex drive may not be affected, but purposeful movement is. Schneider's disability resembles Gamble's experiences in the Canadian north. In both

cases apraxia occurred when the intentional system which links the world to a performance of some kind had been forgotten or suppressed.

If assimilation remains the hidden purpose behind "objective" decisions which putatively have the good of indigenous people in mind, then cross-cultural relations can become knotted in group apraxia. Good conscious intentions miss that "The essential point is clearly to grasp the project towards the world that we are" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:405). Objective thinking based upon traditional categorical hierarchies creates some of its most severe problems when it tries to deal with systemic structures like cultures and the ecology. Toolbox idealism severs the link between a purposive subject and an object world "putting in their place the clear idea of the object as *in-itself* and of the subject as pure consciousness" (Ibid.:320). This kind of characteristic western behavior appears to many non-westerners to be just as peculiar as Schneider's. Incredible feats of manipulation and power remain apraxic with "the pathos of a rationality which yet does not see itself as so hardened that it has to hold aloof from the 'true world' in which humankind live" (Lubbe, 1978:118).

Many people experience the acculturation dilemma as repugnance at the attitudes which are required in order to master the skill repertoires of the dominant culture. Sealey sensitively asks, "whether education [should be] based on the assumption that scientific explanations are the natural and realistic way to view the world," (1980:66) and then stops because going on would be irrational in the terms of reference of the dominant culture. For Sealey, the basic question remains "a dichotomy of science and magic" (Ibid.:65). Sealey's terminology hides the emotional block facing a non-westerner attempting to adjust to middle-class society. There is as yet no happy merging of western logic to a theory of culture. As a result, many of the economically excluded choose to die or self-destruct rather than prosper alone.

The accultured survivor has to outwit a nineteenth century cognitive style that is appropriate for technology, but inappropriate for human relations. Toolbox idealism achieves a culture which is not as repulsive for its complexity as for its ugliness. Traditional, categorical thinking provides techniques for doing science and industry, but these categories are misapplied to the hermeneutical operation of understanding. Traditional interpretation does not think in "simultaneous wholes," so it loses insight into its basic intentions. The sheer, aesthetic ugliness of the western cognitive style shows in high-tech war, ecological disaster, urban violence and various consumer addictions; but these are rarely considered problems intrinsic to the system of knowledge. Schmidt begins his study of Hegel and Heidegger with the observation that "More important is to recognize that technology is the expression and product of a way of thinking and a set of values" (1980:xi). The objectivist argument from utility hides the emotional premises upon which world-views are always

predicated. Troy may have been a commercial crossroad, but it was Helen who launched a thousand ships.

Kuckhohn noticed that the Navaho Indians always left part of the design of a pot, a basket, or a blanket unfinished if they were making the item for themselves and not commercial sale. When a medicine man instructed an apprentice he always left a little bit of the mythological story untold. Its conclusion was left to be explained in dialogue (1944:37). I have observed a similar trait in the extant manuscripts of Classical Grecian music. The Greeks finished a song on the leading tone of the scale which suggests a conclusion to the ear, but does not actually finish it. The listener is left to draw his own conclusion. Surely one would be quite fortunate to be able to understand the sensual beauty that illumines the life of those who inhabit these - to us - quite distant cultural worlds. Kluckhohn referred to such phenomena as "the implicit culture," and in his day he could get away with using the old evocative words "ethos" and "*Zeitgeist*" (1944:37).

The context of social behavior enters emotional experience before it can enter verbal analysis. Whether the ensuing resistance to acculturation is creative or self-destructive, it certainly declares an honest inability to do for the already encultured what they do not seem capable of doing for themselves. If the already encultured do not criticize their own system of knowledge, how can an outsider do it for them? Service professionals categorize data, but they have inherited an inadequate grammar with which to classify experience. "It should hardly be necessary to add that primary socialization involves more than purely cognitive learning. It takes place under circumstances that are highly charged emotionally" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:121). The capacity for effective concern depends upon understanding the emotional circumstances in which purely cognitive learning occurs. Ingrained habits of personal detachment and conceptual abstraction significantly reduce that capacity.

The shell-shocked Schneider had lost contact with the metaphor base of his physical world. He remembered the reasoning, but he did not understand it. The sense of "simultaneous wholes" which he lacked is the same "pivotal aesthetic paradox" (Seboek, 1979) upon which all "representation" is based. Without some sense of the inner duality of meaning, the speaker, writer, painter, orator, etc. lacks the "knack" for the craft. Representation in language and the fine arts is always a two dimensional rendering of a multi-faceted whole. The fine arts are the ground level of all communicative arts and, as Johnson and Lakoff explain (1980), the old Kantian intuition that judgement is developed through aesthetics contains truth, although a portentous one. The gaze of the beholder "invests" an object, "penetrates and animates it" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 264). In *Signs*, Merleau-Ponty called the attributions of the beholder "the other history, without which the first would be impossible" (1964:60). The beholder is snared by a consensus trap of culturally induced plausibility.

The madness of which Foucault writes in is possession by consensus with no emotional balance between value context and formal logic. Technology can become an ego-trap. when a linear logic appropriate for machines destroys dialogue, "madness hangs forever over history" (Foucault ,1965:287). Madness is Schneider's absurd literality, the absence of cultural context, the denial of a feeling-tone which signifies a process. In contradistinction to Levi-Strauss, if one can speak of a "Savage Mind," to do so describes the declension of an absurd literality where human subjects are possessed by a discourse that has lost all wonder in the face of the human world and science has become a strategem. In cross-cultural dialogue an idealized fantasy of a middle-class lifestyle can snare the gaze of the encultured beholder. Herskovits' definition of acculturation means being snared. The concept "economic development" can become Foucaultian madness, metonymically extending a man-machine into real and irremedial self-destruction.

Hilary Putnam, the logical pragmatist who influenced Lakoff and Johnson, suspects that the major dualisms which haunt Western philosophy "are attempts to evade the scope of reason" (1981:126). Scientific reason empirically deduced a world because first of all it believed in *a priori* truth. It was this belief which gave Western culture what Putnam calls a "God's eye view" of the world. I believe that Westerners habitually use the God's-eye view on each other with devastating consequences for interpersonal understanding. Cross-cultural dialogue is the disaster site where multiple God's-eye solipsisms explode into politics.

Gamble was certainly stepping beyond the toolbox idealism of western engineering with his commentary on the Rae/Edzo project. Sealey clearly feels that a larger and more inclusive dialogue is necessary. Yet, to my knowledge few documented instances of deliberately laying aside the tools of one's profession on behalf of compassion and understanding are available for admiration and study. One such instance may be Stoller's *Splitting* (1973), the documentary case-study of his own work with a psychotic lesbian from a Los Angeles barrio. The patient expressed her disdain for *machismo* by shooting men in the derriere. Possessed by inadequate understanding, she found the most direct and effective way to point out (if one truly holds her unshakeable belief) that men are a proverbial "pain in the ass." Stoller believed that his patient's therapy would have been terminated by the application of the major symptom to Stoller, himself, if he had taken the normal therapeutic approach to her behavior. The destructive aspects of the patient's behaviour were controlled because Stoller showed respect for the communication content behind his patient's bizarre behavior.

Without an understanding interpreter, dramatic gestures can kill a dialogue. Limentani, past president of the International Psychoanalytic Society, suggests in his work that "Perhaps no other area has undergone such dynamic re-orientation as in the toleration of acting out...Acting out is

taken as unconscious communication and not only as the resistance to abstinent technique" (1989:36). The breakdown of dialogue may act out a significant critique of normative values. Toleration of apraxic gestures would be an important step toward the deconstruction of whatever chauvinisms may permeate the intentional system of the dominant culture.

A feeling-tone of rivalry creeps into cross-cultural relations, preventing the equitable application of practical science. Both partners in attempted dialogue see the other as ineffective and stupid. The enculturating, dominant side privatizes, fragments, and detaches social problems from culture and community because its cognitive style is mechanical. The minority, acculturating side psychologically resists the techniques of personal dominance which they experience, repugnantly, as covert attempts to assimilate their feelings and emotions. The emotional shock of being acculturated rejects quality of life techniques. The emotional advantage of being the enculturator fosters sadism and chauvinism. Aboriginal group apraxia, such as unteachability, addiction, violence, violent chauvinism and cynical dishonesty, symptomatically are the image of an emotional power struggle, not the measure of the value of clashing cultures. They act out the dominance and dependency cycle of conventional acculturation. The dependency problem feeds off the dominant myth of technological supremacy. The cycle of dependency can only be broken when the mythologies of both dialogue partners have been deconstructed.

Ferry and Renault conclude in their severe criticism of Heidegger that "The Difference between cultures cannot be nonchalantly measured with the yardstick of a teleological history of humanity...Mankind is characterized by the capacity to transcend any particular definition...in order to enter into communication with other human beings (1990:94)." It is not a question of value but "purely a question of fact whether this or that people symbolizes this strictly human capacity...There is no evolutionism of principle" (Ibid.:103). The tragedy of the dominant culture is that a people who have accomplished so much to transcend physical need have done so little to communicate with their fellow beings. The result has been the futility of knowledge and the suppression of wisdom. Where technique is taught as a tool of dominance, the best will reject that vision of the world.

All service professionals, including academics, must accommodate the suspicion that even with the most generous of good wishes, their toolbox is not emotionally neutral. The subjective detachment of a traditional logic suitable for tools, not people, often treats human problems in bad faith, creating a policy world of Schneiders who are "unable to bring their own thoughts before themselves". These policy makers are snared in the same helplessness as their victims. Dialogue is the only answer, but it must start with a recognition of the emotional base which constitutes primary socialization. Professionals have to understand that they have a culture, too.

Cross-cultural dialogue should be a source of wisdom, rather than an experience of conflict for us. Understanding the emotional world which is culturally prefigured in skill repertoires establishes the possibility for either cynical exploitation or meaningful dialogue. "The concept of culture," Max Weber wrote, "is a *value-concept* " (1949:76). If he were correct, as I believe that he was, moral reflection is imperative. Otherwise, pain and misunderstanding will continue to haunt cross-cultural dialogue and Paul Ricoeur's brooding vision of the unhappy Freud will summarize the discontent of all civilizations: "Suffering must accompany the task of culture like a tragic fate (1970:196)."

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